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Abstract—In the scope of VANETs, nature of exchanged
safety/warning messages renders itself highly location dependent as
it is usually for incident reporting. Thus, vehicles are required to
periodically exchange beacon messages that include speed, time and
GPS location information. In this paper paper, we present a physical
layer assisted message authentication scheme that uses Angle of
Arrival (AoA) estimation to verify the message originator location
based on the claimed location information.
Within the considered vehicular communication settings, funda-
mental limits of AoA estimation are developed in terms of its Cramer
Rao Bound (CRB) and existence of efficient estimator. The problem
of deciding whether the received signal is originated from the claimed
GPS location is formulated as a two sided hypotheses testing problem
whose solution is given by Wald test statics. Moreover, we use correct
decision, PD , and false alarm, PF , probabilities as a quantitative
performance measure. The observation posterior likelihood function
is shown to satisfy regularity conditions necessary for asymptotic
normality of the ML-AoA estimator. Thus, we give PD and PF in
a closed form.
We extend the potential of physical layer contribution in security
to provide physical layer assisted secret key agreement (SKA)
protocol. A public key (PK) based SKA in which communicating
vehicles are required to validate their respective physical location.
We show that the risk of the Man in the Middle attack, which
is common in PK-SKA protocols without a trusted third party, is
waived up to the literal meaning of the word ”middle”.
Index Terms—VANET, wireless authentication, Physical layer
Security , Angle of Arrival, Secret Key Agreement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of wireless VANET is of great importance due to the
close relation between the information exchanged in VANETs
to the public safety. The untethered nature of the open wire-
less medium of VANETs open the door for a wide range of
security vulnerability issues. Message authentication, maintaining
privacy, confidentiality, non-repudiation and information integrity
are all basic security requirements in a typical communication
network. In addition, the high mobile nature of VANET users
together with the sensitive safety information exchanged require
real time availability of the network. Therefore, the stringent
delay requirements in VANETS impose further constraints on
the complexity of the potential solutions. These requirements, in
fact, offers a big challenge due to the large scale of VANET.
Moreover, the cooperative nature of VANETs offers a set of
an additional security challenges. That is the impact of security
openings can propagate to the entire network due to frequent
exchange of messages among all vehicles. Therefore, message
source authentication is a major crucial requirements in VANETs
as bogus messages can threaten drivers safety and/or convenience.
For example in a highway, false warning or safety message
injected from outsider or an insider with rational intentions may
cause the entire traffic to be blocked and may have potentially
fatal safety threatening consequences.
There is an extensive research made to assess security vulner-
abilities and requirements of VANET. Denial of service attacks
including flooding, jamming [1], spamming, malware and black
hole attacks have been reported to have a potential effect up
to complete blockage of VANET. Moreover, attacks on node
authentication is another type of attacks that is of a great concern
as an unauthorized activity may threaten people lives. Message
authentication in VANETs is based on public key infrastructure
(PKI) where a certificate authority (CA) is responsible for issuing,
manage, distribute and revoke certificates [2]. The use of authen-
tication certificate may eliminate the possibility of impersonation
attack, however, it offers a considerable message overhead as
it requires the certificate to be associated with each message
transmission [3]. Moreover, it doesn’t eliminate the possibility
of using a stolen identity (Masquerading Attack), message re-
transmission (Reply Attack [4]-can be mitigated by associating
an authenticated time stamp at each message transmission) or
the use of multiple legitimate identities (Sybil Attack [5]) by
an illegitimate node. Several solutions have been proposed to
mitigate the potential of the aforementioned attacks. Readers may
refer to [6] for an extensive survey on security in VANETs.
Security at the physical layer is the information theoretic
counterpart of the computational security designed in the upper
communication layers. At the physical layer, several parameters
like Received Signal Strength (RSS) [7], Channel State Informa-
tion (CSI) [8], Angle of Arrival (AoA) [9] and Angle of Departure
(AoD) can be exploited to provide reliable and time efficient
security tools. The nature of messages exchanged over VANETs,
usually reporting incident at a given location, renders itself highly
location dependent. Thus, VANET nodes are required to exchange
beacon messages periodically that incorporates user specific
information including anonymous identity, time, GPS location
and speed to ensure the cooperative awareness of neighboring
vehicles. An illegitimate node may intentionally falsify these
information as to achieve a certain goal which might be rational
in some scenarios. Therefore, in contrast to other physical layer
parameters, AoA is of a contextual meaning that can contribute
to message authentication decision.
In this paper paper, we present a physical layer assisted
message authentication scheme that uses AoA estimation to verify
the message originator location. The scheme makes use of the
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information contained in beacon messages to validate the claimed
GPS location information with the AoA information obtained
at the physical layer. The proposed scheme offers a physical
cross verification tool that integrates the existing conventional PKI
message authentication and makes use of the available physical
layer information. The proposed scheme comes as a solution for
message authentication problem in VANETs under the following
impersonation/message substitution attack scenarios:
1) Attacker with single or multiple stolen identities (Sybil
attack) that intentionally falsies different GPS locations.
2) Attacker that spoofs/jams GPS information [10],[11] of
other nodes in the network to let them report their incidents
in certain/erroneous GPS locations.
Noting that in all of the considered attack scenarios, message
received at the target receiver will pass the conventional PKI
procedures as it is either originated from an attacker with a stolen
identity or a legitimate transmitter with spoofed/jammed GPS
information. To the best of the authors knowledge, no solutions
are available at the upper security layer to such types of attacks.
To that end, we develop the fundamental limits of AoA
estimation in terms of its Cramer Rao Bound (CRB) which sets a
lower bound on any AoA estimator variance. We also proceed by
introducing the maximum likelihood (ML) AoA estimator which
is shown to be consistent asymptotically in the array size. Based
on the knowledge of the declared AoA of arrival of all neigh-
boring vehicles/Road side units (RSU) extracted from the beacon
messages, θb, we formulate the problem of deciding whether the
received signal is originated from the declared physical direction
of a given vehicle/RSU as a two sided hypotheses testing problem
whose solution is given by Wald test statics [12]. Moreover, as
a quantitative measure for the proposed scheme performance, we
use probability of denying an authentic transmission (1−PD with
PD being the probability of correct decision) and the probability
of accepting an illegitimate message (false alarm probability PF ).
We show that the observation posterior likelihood function satis-
fies regularity conditions necessary for the asymptotic normality
of the ML-AoA estimator. Thus, we find PD and PF in a closed
form.
In addition, another major challenge that faces the prevalence
of VANETs is the secret key agreement(SKA) between peer
vehicles. In the scope of VANETs, secure interaction between
vehicles should be established rapidly without any interaction
with the CA during the session key exchange. The process of
sharing the secret key is called Secret Key Agreement (SKA). In
this paper, we extend the potential of physical layer contribution
in security to provide a novel physical layer assisted secret key
agreement protocol. A public key based SKA in which commu-
nicating vehicles are able to validate their respective physical
location based on the claimed location information in the beacon
messages. We show in an algorithmic way that risk of the Man
in the Middle (MitM) attack, which is common in PKI SKA
protocols with no trusted third party, is waived up to the literal
meaning of the word ”middle”.
Contributions of this work can summarized as follows:
• We introduce the AoA information as a security parameter
that is used in conjunction with conventional PKI as solution
to the problem of security against attacker with stolen
identities.
• We develop the fundamental limits of AoA estimation for
the considered modelin terms of CRB, also, we provide a
closed form expression for the correct decision/false alarm
probabilities as a quantitative measure for the proposed
scheme performance.
• We introduce a novel joint SKA protocol that turns the MitM
attack into the literal meaning of the word ”middle” (the
attacker has to be located in the middle).
Related Work. This not the first work that address physical
layer exploitation for enhanced security in VANET. In [13], a
Physical layer Assisted message Authentication (PAA) under PKI
in vehicular communication networks in which a trust between
two vehicles can be maintained by comparing the current es-
timated channel response and the previous estimated channel
response. This method offers a tool for maintaining authentication
between two communication nodes, however, the initial authen-
tication phase is still vulnerable. Rather, the estimated channel
response by itself is contextually meaningless, i.e., it can not
provide any information that can be used by the application layer
for further assessment of the message contents.
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELS
In the rest of this paper we use boldface uppercase letters for
random vectors/matrices, uppercase letters for their realizations,
bold face lowercase letters for deterministic vectors and lowercase
letters for its elements. While, (.)∗ denotes conjugate of complex
number, (.)† denotes conjugate transpose, IN denotes identity
matrix of size N , tr(.) denotes matrix trace operator, var(.)
denotes variance of random variable, E[.] dentoes expectation
operator, det(.) denotes matrix determinant operator and 1m×n
denotes a m× n matrix of all 1’s.
A. System model
As illustrated in Fig. (1), we consider the scenario in which
a VANET consists of multiple vehicles in the vicinity of a RSU
of known location. Beacon messages are exchanged periodically
to collect neighboring vehicles GPS locations, time and speed
information. An attacker with a stolen identity falsifies its location
information aiming to mislead the target vehicles to accept its
message. The stolen identity may be for another vehicle or
RSU. For simplicity, we assume all communication nodes to be
equipped with multiple antenna transceivers each of array size
n, however, the case of different array size at each node does
not affect the obtained results. Similarly, we will assume the
uniform linear array (ULA) antenna configuration, however, the
obtained results apply directly to any other antenna configuration
with straightforward manipulation.
The attacker message, M, is divided into np packets, each
packet is sent over the air using 802.11p [14] physical layer in
the form of ns OFDM symbols. Each OFDM symbol consists
of 64-subcarriers, among the 64 subcarriers, 52 are used for data
transmission, which is further composed of 48 data and 4 pilot
subcarriers. The pilot subcarriers are usually used for channel
estimation, however, in our settings we use it for AoA estimation
purpose as well. Thus, no extra communication overhead is
needed for the AoA estimation. Further, over each subcarrier, we
assume the channel to be flat, i.e., the the coherence bandwidth
is larger than the bandwidth of each subchannel. The discrete
Fig. 1. System Model
baseband equivalent channel (after FFT operation at the receiver)
for the signal received by one of the target vehicles can be
expressed as:
Y[i, j, k] = H[i, j, k]X[i, j, k] + N[i, j, k], (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ np, 1 ≤ j ≤ ns and 1 ≤ k ≤ 64 denotes the
packet number, symbol index and subcarrier index respectively,
X[i, j, k] ∈ Cn×1 is the attacker signal constrained by an instanta-
neous maximum power constraint E
[
tr
(
X[i, j, k]X†[i, j, k]
)] ≤
P. Also, H[i, j, k] ∈ Cn×n is the channel coefficients matrix
between attacker and target vehicle. Finally, N[i, j, k] ∈ Cn×1 is
an independent zero mean circular symmetric complex random
vector, N ∼ CN (0, RN ) where RN = σ2NIn.
VANETs are designed to provide wireless access for vehicles
in a line of sight (LOS) environment for a maximum distance of
1 Km. Thus, we model the channel as a Rician fading channel.
In Rician fading model, the received signal can be decomposed
into two components; one is the specular component originated
from the LOS path and the other is the diffuse component due
to ground reflections and scatters from neighboring vehicles and
other objects in the environment, or generally the non-line of sight
component (NLOS). The LOS component can be considered fixed
while the NLOS component can be best described as a Rayleigh
fading channel.
H = HLOS + HNLOS, (2)
where HLOS and HNLOS represents the LOS and NLOS compo-
nents respectively and
HLOS =
√
k
1 + k
(
1√
2
+
j√
2
)
Ψ
HNLOS =
√
1
2(1 + k)
Hˆ, (3)
where k is the Ricean factor, Ψ = ar(θ)a
†
t(φ), ar(θ) and at(φ)
are the antenna array steering vectors at receiver and transmitter
respectively, θ and φ are the AoA and AoD of the transmitted
signal respectively as shown in Fig. (1). Hˆ ∼ CN (0, In×n)
represents the channel coefficients matrix for the NLOS signal
component.
For the ULA configuration, the entries of the steering vectors
are given by
a(θ) =
[
1 z z2 . . . zn−1
]T
z = e
−j2pi
d sin(θ)
λ , (4)
where λ, d, and n are the wavelength of the center frequency
of the transmitted signal, array elements spacing and size re-
spectively. We parametrize the contribution of the NLOS and
LOS components to the signal with σ =
√
1/2(1 + k), µ =√
k/(1 + k), respectively and choose µ2+2σ2 = 1 for simplicity.
It worth mentioning that, AWGN and Rayleigh fading channels
are in fact limiting cases of the Rician fading channel.
B. Conventional PKI Message Authentication in VANET
In this section we give basics of PKI based message authentica-
tion in VANETs. As illustrated in Fig. (2), the message originator
sends its certificate with its signed message to the receiver. The
message receiver first verifies the certificate issuer’s signature
on the certificate using the public key of the CA. A successful
verification indicates that the public key on the certificate belongs
to the subject of the certificate. The message receiver proceeds
to use this public key to verify the signature on the received
message. A successful verification informs the message receiver
that the message was signed by the subject of the certificate and
that the message content has not been altered since it was signed.
Each sender must be sure that all the receivers have its certificate
before they need to verify its signature.
Fig. 2. Typical PKI Message Authentication in VANET
C. Attack Model
Attacks on message authentication. As noted before, we
study message authentication problem in VANETs under the
following attack scenarios;
1) Attacker with single or multiple stolen identities (Sybil
attack) that intentionally falsies different GPS locations for
different identities.
2) Attacker that spoofs/jams GPS information [10], [11] of
other nodes in the network to let them report their incidents
in certain/erroneous GPS locations.
The attacker associate the stolen certificate, C, to its payload mes-
sage, M, signed with its private key, priva. Thus the concatenated
attacker message can be expressed as
M =< ID | M | sig [M,priva] | T | C >, (5)
where ID is the stolen identity, sig [M,priva] is the signature
of the attacker using its private key, T is the time stamp with
′|′ as the message concatenation operator. Further, the attacker
is assumed to have the freedom to declare false GPS location
information to achieve its goal.
Noting that in the considered attack scenario, message received
at the target receiver will pass the conventional PKI procedures
as it is either originated from an attacker with a stolen identity or
a legitimate transmitter with spoofed/jammed GPS information.
To the best of the authors knowledge, no solutions are available
at the upper security layer for attacks with stolen identities or
attacks with spoofed or jammed GPS information.
Attack on SK exchange. Let two legitimate vehicles, namely
A and B, attempt to share a secret key, K, using PK based SK
agreement protocol without a trusted third party. The attacker,
E, (again with a stolen identity) is considered to be an active
eavesdropper which is able to intercept the communication be-
tween A and A and attempts to establish independent connections
with both legitimate vehicles simultaneously and relay messages
between them in order to let them believe they are communicating
directly to each other over a secure link. In such scenario, the
attacker has to perform two independent successful impersonation
attacks with both legitimate vehicles to successfully taking over
the control of the overall communication link. Doing so, the
attacker will be able to intercept, decode, modify or even fabricate
all relayed messages. This attack is known as the Man-in-the-
Middle (MitM) attack 1 where it combines Impersonation, Mod-
ification/substitution and/or Fabrication attacks simultaneously.
III. BASIC LIMITS OF AOA ESTIMATION
In section IV, we will introduce the AoA information as a
security parameter that is used in conjunction with conventional
PKI as solution to the problem of security against attackers
with stolen identities. Therefor, we start by introducing the
fundamental limits of AoA estimation. We first note that there
is no prior distribution assumed for θ, therefore, the associated
estimation problem is non-Bayesian. In estimation theory, the
Cramer Rao Bound (CRB) sets an upper bound on any parameter
estimation performance. In particular, it defines the lower bound
of the best estimator variance in terms of the solution of the
following problem:
min
θˆ(·)
E[tr(X[i,j,k]X†[i,j,k])]≤P
var
(
θˆ (Y)
)
. (6)
To evaluate the CRB, we start by introducing
Z[l] = HNLOS[l]X[l] + N[l], (7)
where Z incorporates all undesired interfering components of the
received signal, 1 ≤ l ≤ L where L = 4 × ns × np is the total
number of pilot subcarriers contained in a message consists of
1In practice, the MitM attack is more applicable to wired rather than wireless
networks due to the untethered nature of the wireless medium. However, a
successful MitM attack may be accomplished by reactively sending a jamming
signal once link activity is detected. Hence, only the attacker will be able to hear
the transmitting node message and form an appropriate response while the victim
receiver is kept ignorant by the effect of the attacker jamming signal. Moreover,
the attacker may try to perform an impersonation attack with either or each node
proactively rather than reactively in order to either inject a false information or
to reveal sensitive information a victim node may have.
np packets each packet contains ns symbols. Since the receiver
objective is to estimate the AoA of the LOS component, the
NLOS diffuse component originated from ground reflections or
scatters from neighboring vehicle is also considered as an unde-
sired signal. Note that Z[l] ∼ CN (0n×1,Rz[l]). Accordingly, the
posterior distribution of the observation Y is given as follows:
fY|HLOSt ,X,(y) =
1∏L
l=1 det(piRz[l])
× exp{− 1
L
L∑
l=1
(y[l]−HLOS[l]X[l])†Rz[l]−1
(y[l]−HLOS[l]X[l])}, (8)
which yields the following log-likelihood function
L(y) = −
L∑
i=1
ln det(piRz[l])
− tr (R−1z (y −HLOSX)(y −HLOSX)†) , (9)
where Rz =
1
L
∑L
i=1 Rz[l]. Further, It can be shown that, the
CRB of AoA estimation is given by
CRB =
1
2
[
L∑
l=1
Re
(
µX†[l]Dˆ†G(θ)DˆX[l]µ
)]−1
=
1 + k
2LkPDˆ†G(θ)Dˆ
, (10)
where
Dˆ = R−1/2z D
D = ∂a/∂θ
G(θ) = [I− a(a†a)−1a†]
where the dependence of a on θ was dropped for ease of notation.
We note that, as k → ∞, only LOS component is present and
Rz → σ2NIn. Also, one can show that (this was also discussed in
[15]) consistent estimator exists in the large sample limit (L →
∞) whereas efficient estimator exists only asymptotically in the
array size (n→∞) [16]. Moreover, the ML-AoA estimator given
by:
θˆ(Y) = arg min
θ
tr
(
B†R−1/2z G(θ)R
−1/2
z B
)
(11)
achieves the CRB with equality asymptotically in the large array
size limit and is a consistent estimator, where
B = R†xyR
−1
xx ∈ Cn×n, (12)
Rxy =
1
L
L∑
l=1
X[l]Y†[l] ∈ Cn×n,
Rxx =
1
L
L∑
l=1
X[l]X[l]∗ ∈ Cn×n.
Furthermore, note that the regularity conditions required for the
normality of the ML-AoA estimator [17], [18] holds for the
likelihood function (8) of the considered model. Thus, in the limit
of large sample, the ML-AoA estimator converges in distribution
to a random variable with a truncated 2 normal distribution by
the central limit theorem with mean equals to the true AoA and
variance equals to the CRB given in Eq. (10). This can be formally
expressed as follows:
fθˆ(θˆ(Y)) =
1√
2piCRB
exp{−(θˆ − θ)
2
2CRB
}
Q
(−pi/2− θ√
CRB
)
−Q
(
pi/2− θ√
CRB
) ,
(13)
where Q is the tail probability of the standard normal distribu-
tion. The results obtained in this section will be useful in the
subsequent analysis in the rest of this paper.
IV. JOINT PHYSICAL-SECURITY LAYER MESSAGE
AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we delve into the details of the proposed
physical layer assisted message authentication scheme. In the
scope of VANETs, the exchanged safety and warning messages,
which usually comes in the form of incident reporting, is highly
dependent on the location of the message originators. Thus,
vehicles in VANETs are required to periodically exchange beacon
messages that include speed, time and location information. These
information can be used to predict the physical direction of a
given message source based on its GPS location claimed in its
beacon message, θb. In this work we propose that, an estimate
for the AoA, θˆ, can be formed to be cross validated with one
computed at the upper layers. The major advantage of this
method is to provide the upper communication layers with a
potential awareness about the physical communication environ-
ment. Having such advantage, security protocols at the upper
communication layers are enabled with physical information that
can help in a more informed security decision.
In what follows, by expected AoA we mean the AoA calculated
from the GPS location information claimed in the beacon message
of a given transmitter and denote it θb. Meanwhile, by the esti-
mated AoA, denoted θˆ, we mean the AoA estimate obtained from
the physical layer signal representation of a given transmitter.
A. Proposed Physical layer Assisted Authentication
We assume all vehicles/RSUs are associated with anonymous
identity ID, private key, priv, public key, pub, and granted
a certificate C encrypted using the CA private key. Each vehi-
cle/RSU is assumed to have GPS location information about itself
and about other neighboring vehicles/RSUs using the periodically
exchanged beacon messages. In the first place, the received mes-
sage will go through the conventional PKI message authentication
procedures as described in Section II-B. In the security layer, GPS
location information can be used to calculate the angle of the
transmitting node measured from true north. Thus, the receiving
node should expect the transmission of a transmitting node at a
given GPS location on an AoA equals to the calculated angle
measured from true north taking into consideration the direction
of its own antenna array orientation vector. The direction of the
antenna array orientation vector is defined by the direction of the
2The truncation in the normal distribution is due to the finite support of the
ML-AoA estimator. We limit the support θ to the interval [−pi/2, pi/2] due to the
ULA antenna configuration, however, for 2-D antenna configuration with 360◦
resolution, the support of θ is extended to [−pi, pi].
Fig. 3. The relation Between the Estimated AoA and the bearing information
calculated from the GPS location Information.
antenna array axis to the true north. Fig. (3) illustrates the relation
between the expected AoA and the bearing information that can
be calculated from the exchanged GPS location information.
Let the pairs (xt, yt) and (xr, yr) be the longitude and latitude
coordinates of the transmitting and receiving nodes respectively.
Then, the heading angle, θh, measured from the true north of a
plane wave emitted at (xt, yt) and received at (xr, yr) can be
calculated as follows:
θh = atan2(ν, υ), (14)
where atan2 is the arctangent function with two arguments [19]
and
ν = cos(yr) sin(xr − xt),
υ = cos(yt) sin(yr)− sin(yt) cos(yr) cos(xr − xt). (15)
Denoting the angle between the receiver antenna array axis
to the true north by θNr , then, the receiver can calculate the
expected AoA, θb, of that particular transmitter according to the
information in its beacon message as follows:
θb = θh + θ
N
r . (16)
Further, at the physical layer, an estimate θˆ is formed according
to Eq. (11) for the actual AoA of the received message. Using
the estimate θˆ from the physical layer and the expected AoA
arrival, θb, each vehicle/RSU builds up a table containing the
expected as well as the estimated AoAs of the transmission of
each of the other neighboring vehicles/RSUs as illustrated in
Table (I). Note that, those messages that fail in PKI message
authentication procedures will be dropped and it will not have an
entry in the above table. Thus, nv is the number of vehicles/RSUs
in the vicinity that passed the PKI authentication procedures
successfully. Further, each vehicle keeps updating the values of
Table (I) whenever a message is received. Now, the receiver
objective is to check the consistency between the declared AoA
of a given message source and the estimate of the actual AoA.
In the next section, we develop mathematical formulation of the
receiver objective as a hypothesis testing problem.
Vehicle ID GPS Location Expected AoA Estimated AoA
ID1 (x1, y1) θ1b θˆ1
ID2 (x2, y2) θ2b θˆ2
...
...
...
...
IDi (xi, yi) θ
i
b θˆi
...
...
...
...
IDnv (xnv , ynv ) θ
nv
b
ˆθnv
TABLE I
LIST OF EXPECTED AND ESTIMATED AOAS ASSOCIATED TO EACH
VEHICLE/RSU ID
B. Formulation of AoA Authorization as a Hypothesis Testing
Problem
Based on the knowledge of the declared AoA of arrival of all
neighboring vehicles/RSUs extracted from the beacon messages,
θb, the problem of deciding whether the received signal is origi-
nated from the declared physical direction of a given vehicle/RSU
can be formulated as a two sided hypotheses testing problem as
follows:
H0 : θ ∈ Γ0
H1 : θ ∈ Γ1, (17)
where Γ0 and Γ1 are the decision regions for H0 and H1
receptively and are defined as follows:
Γ0 = [−pi/2, θb) ∪ (θb, pi/2]
Γ1 = {θb}. (18)
Note that, the probability of misdetection, PMD, which is the
probability of rejecting a true H1 hypothesis, corresponds to
denying a transmission originated from the legitimate transmitter.
Whereas, the false alarm probability of accepting a false H0
hypothesis will correspond to impersonation probability as access
will be granted to an illegitimate transmitter.
Recalling the posterior distribution of the received signal given
in Eq. (8), we observe that Y|Hi ∼ CN (HLOSθ X,Ru) where θ ∈
Γi and i ∈ {0, 1}. Among different hypothesis testing techniques
like Likelihood Ratio (LR), Lagrange Multiplier (LM) or Score
tests, the Wald test is the most convenient test for the considered
hypothesis testing problem. That is due to the highly nonlinear
relation between the observation, Y, and the composite parameter
we test for [12], θ in our case. The Wald test statistics can be
found as
|θˆ − θb|√
CRB
H0
R
H1
α, (19)
where, θˆ is the ML-AoA estimator given in Eq. (11) and α is
the decision threshold. Note that, the CRB of AoA estimation is
a function of the AoA as can be seen in Eq. (10) with the fact
that angles near the array axis, −pi/2 or pi/2, experience much
higher CRB than those close to zero. Thus we can notice that,
the Wald test statistics accounts for that problem by incorporating
the CRB to achieve an adaptive decision threshold. Recalling the
distribution of the ML-AoA estimator given in Eq. (13), we define
both the probability of detection an probability of false alarm as
follows:
PD = P
(
|θˆ − θb|√
CRB
≤ α|H1
)
PF = P
(
|θˆ − θb|√
CRB
≤ α|H0
)
(20)
Thus, one would expect a relatively high false alarm probability
as the attacking node approaches in a close vicinity to the declared
AoA, θb.
V. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
VANET is a vehicular wireless enabling technology that is
expected to enable peer vehicles to establish a secure communica-
tion link without interaction with a trusted third party. In contrast
to public key cryptosystems, symmetric key cryptosystems offers
the advantage of low communication overhead as well as rel-
atively low computational complexity. However, symmetric key
cryptosystems require transmitting and receiving communication
vehicles to agree on a secret key prior to communication. The
process of sharing the secret key is called Secret Key Agreement.
In this section, we provide a novel physical layer assisted secret
key agreement protocol in which communicating vehicles are able
to validate their respective physical location based on the claimed
location information in the beacon messages. We consider a
public key based secret key agreement between vehicles A and
B without trusted third party interaction. As shown in Fig. (4),
the proposed SKA procedures can be illustrated in the following
steps
1) A select one of its preloaded public/private key pairs
together with their corresponding certificate.
2) A sends a message including its own public key asking for
B’s public key.
3) B accepts the message if it both pass the conventional PKI
authentication and the AoA estimate, θˆa, is consistent with
claimed location information, otherwise, abort.
4) B sends a message including its own public key together
with an m bits quantized version of the estimate θˆa en-
crypted with A’s public key.
5) A accepts the message if it both pass the conventional PKI
authentication and the AoA estimate, θˆb, is consistent with
claimed location information, otherwise, abort.
6) B sends a message including secret session key, K, to-
gether with an m bits quantized version of the estimate θˆb
encrypted with B’s public key.
7) B accepts the message if it both pass the conventional PKI
authentication and the AoA estimate, θˆa, is consistent with
claimed location information, otherwise, abort.
8) Both A and B employs an arbitrary function g(K, θˆa, θˆb)
to generate the physically validated session key K ′.
Note that in all of the propose SKA procedure, physical location
validation is crucial for moving into the next step. This physical
layer awareness introduces the concept of physical hardness to an
attacker performing MitM attack. Now, it is clear that the literal
meaning of the word ”middle” became mandatory as such attacker
has to be be in the middle between target vehicles. Otherwise, its
AoA will not be validated and the impersonation attempt will
fail. This significantly limits the region of possible locations for
the potential MitM attackers to initiate their attack. In Figure
(5), we introduce the concept of area security where a successful
MitM attack requires the attacker to be physically located in the
physically vulnerable area shown in figure.
Fig. 4. Procedures of the Proposed Physical layer Assisted Secret Key Agreement
Protocol.
Fig. 5. Dividing the communication environment into physically vulnerable area
and secure area.
The proposed physical layer assisted secret key agreement
protocol provides the following advantages
1) It provides physical awareness of the environment over
which the authenticated key agreement takes place.
2) Secret key exchange protocols without a trusted third party
are susceptible to MitM attack, however, with the proposed
algorithm, a successful Man in the Middle attack would
require the attacker to be physically located on the LOS
path between the communicating nodes.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation results provided in this section is based on the
following simulation setup:
• 802.11P Protocol Stack. A MATLAB implementation
for the 802.11p standard was implemented as defined in
[14] except that we have added MIMO capability.
• Array Size. All communication nodes are of array size
n = 4.
• Training vector. The predefined training sequence is
acquired from the pilot tones embedded in the protocol
stack.
• Payload Messages. Payload messages are generated
from a zero mean, unit variance complex Gaussian ran-
dom variable and scaled to satisfy the power constraint.
• Communication Channels. All communication chan-
nels are generated according to Equations (2) and (3).
The entries of the channel matrix of the Rayleigh part of
the channel are generated from a zero mean, unit vari-
ance complex Gaussian random variable and then scaled
each by the corresponding value of σ. Meanwhile, the
LOS component is generated for different values of k
which we will mention for each simulation scenario.
Physical layer Assisted Message Authentication. We evaluate
the proposed physical layer assisted message authentication in
terms of the probability of detection, PD, and the false alarm
probability, PF as a function of signal to noise ratio SNR for
decision threshold α ranges from 1◦ to 5◦ an Ricean factor k =
10 and k = 100. While both PD and PF are functions of the
legitimate and attacker locations respectively, we shall give three
different scenarios:
1) To evaluate PD, legitimate vehicle located at 25◦ is consid-
ered. As shown in Fig. (6.(a)), PD approaches 1 as SNR
and α increase, meanwhile, the same result holds true for
increasing the Ricean factor from k = 10 to k = 100 of
course with PD approaches 1 faster as shown in Fig. (6.(b)).
2) To evaluate PF , we first consider attacker vehicle located
at −35◦ while it claims that it is located away from
its claimed location, namely at −25◦. As shown in Fig.
(7.(a)), PF approaches 0 faster for smaller values of α as
SNR increase, meanwhile, the same result holds true for
increasing the Ricean factor from k = 10 to k = 100 of
course with PF approaches 0 faster as shown in Fig. (7.(b)).
3) Then, we consider attacker vehicle located at 40◦ while it
claims that it is located at 37.5◦.
Fig. 6. PD as a function of SNR for α = 1◦ : 5◦ for a vehicle located at 25◦.
(a) k = 10. (b) k = 100.
Physical layer Assisted SKA. Fig. (9) provides a graphical
user interface (GUI) developed in MATLAB in order to visualize
the SKA protocol procedures given in section V.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Communication security in Vehicular Ad-hoc Communication
Networks (VANET) is in a direct relation to public safety. This
work leverages the possible potential cooperation between the
traditional security protocols used in VANETs and information
Fig. 7. PF as a function of SNR for α = 1◦ : 5◦ for an attacker located at
−35◦ with a claimed location of −25◦. (a) k = 10. (b) k = 100.
Fig. 8. PF as a function of SNR for α = 1◦ : 5◦ for an attacker located at
40◦ with a claimed location of 37.5◦. (a) k = 10. (b) k = 100.
Fig. 9. Matlab GUI Implementation for the Proposed SKA, AoA is checked for
correctness at each message, α = 2, SNR = 10dB.
about the physical environment that can be estimated at the phys-
ical layer. Taking into account the inherited location dependence
of safety messages exchanged over VANETs, direction of arrival
is a physical property that can be exploited to amplify trust level
of a given message source.
In this paper, a message source authentication scheme for
VANETs is proposed that is based on the cooperation between
the traditional PKI authentication procedures in VANETs together
with the signal direction of arrival estimated at the physical
layer. Based on the periodically exchanged beacon messages, our
scheme compares the AoA estimate of the signal observed at
the physical layer with the ”claimed” AoA based on the location
information contained in the safety message. It is shown that,
the provided security gain comes with no extra communication
overhead, bandwidth or transmit power as opposed to security
solutions provided in the upper layers.
We also provided a novel physical layer assisted secret key
agreement protocol in which communicating vehicles are able to
validate their respective physical location based on the claimed
location information in the beacon messages. We showed that the
risk of the MitM attack, which is common in PKI SKA protocols
with no trusted third party, is waived up to the literal meaning of
the word ”middle”.
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